QuadrigaCX Ethereum Storage Found

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This report was curated by the CEO and editor of the Zerononcense publication with corroborating information from Jesse Powell, CEO of Kraken Exchange and Taylor Monahan, CEO of MyCrypto.

The author of this report was able to positively identify all exit points for Ethereum in QuadrigaCX-controlled wallets (i.e., transfers from QuadrigaCX not associated with customers).

The author believes that there is a very strong possibility that there may be significant crypto funds (Ethereum) at the following exchanges:
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  1. Kraken
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  2. Bitfinex
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  3. Poloniex
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Based on the transaction analysis included in the report, it appears that a significant amount of Ethereum (600,000+ ETH) was transferred to these exchanges as a means of ‘storage’ during the years that QuadrigaCX was in operation and offering Ethereum on their exchange.

Given the testimony in Jennifer Robertson’s affidavit stating that neither she nor the other involved individuals at QuadrigaCX were knowledgeable about where Gerry Cotten was moving and storing crypto, it is very possible that QuadrigaCX, the creditors, and other entities are unaware of this discovery.

If there are still funds belonging to QuadrigaCX remaining on these exchanges, then that would explain why QuadrigaCX and the community (including the author) have been unable to positively locate any ‘cold wallets’ or ‘reserve cryptocurrency’.

It is also worth noting that Jennifer Robertson stated in her affidavit that Gerry Cotten may have stored some of QuadrigaCX’s funds on other exchanges.

Therefore, based on the findings of this report, the next logical step for all involved parties to take would be to reach out to the aforementioned exchanges to inquire about any accounts that QuadrigaCX held at these exchanges and whether there are still funds there.

There is no cost for such an inquiry and, given the circumstances, it certainly would not hurt to at least reach out to see if there are any funds remaining in the accounts opened up by QuadrigaCX at these exchanges.

The upside to this inquiry is that, if funds are positively located, the knowledge of private keys or passwords would not be necessary to retrieve them. Given the extraneous circumstances, it stands to reason that the above-listed exchanges would be more than willing to facilitate the transfer of these funds back to QuadrigaCX so that they may be redistributed to their customers.

This discovery may also allow QuadrigaCX to regain solvency and continue operating as well. Thus, all parties stand to gain significantly by reaching out directly to Bitfinex, Poloniex, and Kraken to share this report and/or inquiring about accounts related to QuadrigaCX/Gerry Cotten.

The fact that QuadrigaCX had accounts at these exchanges is established and proven in this report. The question now is whether the funds that were transferred to these exchanges for storage purposes are still there. And even if they are not, the exchanges should at least be able to identify where the funds were then transferred to.

So, in any scenario, this report should serve as a helpful addition to the QuadrigaCX narrative, rather than a conspiratorial piece that speculates on whether the exchange or its owners have been honest.
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Report’s Findings
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The following wallets belong to QuadrigaCX, definitively:

  1. 0x0ee4e2d09aec35bdf08083b649033ac0a41aa75e
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  2. 0xd72709b353ded6c8068cc78988613587a4cae8de
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  3. 0xb6aac3b56ff818496b747ea57fcbe42a9aae6218 (current hot wallet)
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  4. 0x027beefcbad782faf69fad12dee97ed894c68549 (former hot wallet)
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  5. 0x45cab8d124fce8663581172c614f2ee08d01d48e
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  6. 0x696dd748a2edd9692ed93bd592dd2f293483eada
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  7. 0x0247bc4e03142079cfa2e3daf500722ed0f9a6b2
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  8. 0xd543154fb94528c4fc54b9c27128c2d86c6322be
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  9. 0x67fC93fD01A15D9FB02a80D0AE6207fB45625be4
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  10. 0xb90a82ec61627885eab72f4253939285ba40c91d
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  11. 0x79855af491352646e73bd12d7b92d6c814e71b4c
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  12. 0x57b727dc48b5d9261958e0fb9f94fa02dc328bf6
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None of the above wallets are customer wallets and this report will provide in-depth explanations for why they are not customer wallets with corroborating statements from Jesse Powell, the owner of Kraken Exchange.

Altogether, a cumulative 649,708 Ethereum was sent to Kraken, Bitfinex, and Poloniex directly by QuadrigaCX, which was worth a total of $100,490,150 at the time of transfer.

This report does not imply that there was any nefarious intent behind the transfers or that these exchanges are in collusion with one another.

Rather to the contrary, this report believes that Jennifer Robertson, the Court Monitor, and all other related individuals at QuadrigaCX were and are unaware of the fact that Gerry Cotten sent these funds to these exchanges.

The manner in which they were sent is consistent with the t**heory posited in Jennifer Robertson’s affidavit that they were sent to these exchanges as a means of storage.**
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The author also notes that it was reported by CBC journalist, Jack Julian, that QuadrigaCX testified at the first creditor hearing that they were unable to locate these funds:
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Therefore, it is in the author’s hopes that this report will serve as the bearer of good news for both QuadrigaCX and its creditors that are seeking to find their funds.
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It Starts With a Bitfinex Deposit Wallet Connected to QuadrigaCX
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We’re going to start this report by looking at a specific Bitfinex deposit wallet address:

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In this wallet specifically, we can see thousands of Ethereum going into a Bitfinex’s hot wallet. Notably, the QuadrigaCX hot wallet is seen sending a substantial amount of Ethereum into this Bitfinex hot wallet.
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Initially, We Could Not Speculate About the Nature of This Wallet
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When this wallet was first discovered, there were two things that we knew:

  1. Withdrawals from the QuadrigaCX hot wallet have been made.
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  2. The wallet was sending funds directly to Bitfinex’s hot wallet.
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Based on the facts above, it could not be said definitively that this wallet belonged to QuadrigaCX exclusively.

This is because  customer at the QuadrigaCX could have simply initiated a withdrawal directly to their Bitfinex address for a litany of reasons, including but not limited to:
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  • Arbitrage
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  • Simply moving to another exchange
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  • Preferring Bitfinex > QuadrigaCX
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Therefore, based on what we knew, it would have been improper and presumptuous, at best, to assume that there was any foul play going on between QuadrigaCX and Bitfinex here.
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Briefly Explaining How ‘Hot Wallets’ Work
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Before we move forward to this report’s primary discovery, this report will briefly outline how ‘hot wallets’ at exchanges work.

What are ‘Hot Wallets’?

‘Hot Wallets’ are ‘collection pools’ for exchanges. Whenever customers initiate a withdrawal from the exchange, it is more than likely that they will be receiving funds from this wallet.

Below, is an Ethereum deposit to QuadrigaCX by a confirmed customer:

Ethereum Transaction 0x54e71038601522b725ddba156d14c4a217271c1b3ee808d0090d1a4fae408a04

Ethereum (ETH) detailed transaction info for 0x54e71038601522b725ddba156d14c4a217271c1b3ee808d0090d1a4fae408a04

The above transaction, posted with the permission of the customer, is the transaction ID for an Ethereum deposit to QuadrigaCX made by the individual in question (identity kept anonymous to respect the user’s privacy).

There is nothing abnormal or illegal about the transaction above.

If readers visit the transaction address, they will see the customer depositing money to an Ethereum address that was created by the QuadrigaCX exchange for that very purpose.

This wallet address was created specifically for the customer in question and, once the funds have entered into the wallet, the customer’s account on the exchange is credited with the corresponding amount of Ethereum.

Typically, once funds are sent to this deposit address, the exchange will then ‘sweep’ the funds into their ‘hot wallet’. We can see this happening with this customer’s funds in the TX below:

Ethereum Transaction 0x8d7fe986067f3118a397aeb9743137dfe9188bdf98399c3e848a93fc91c7e353

Ethereum (ETH) detailed transaction info for 0x8d7fe986067f3118a397aeb9743137dfe9188bdf98399c3e848a93fc91c7e353

The destination ‘hot wallet’ address for QCX = https://etherscan.io/address/0xb6aac3b56ff818496b747ea57fcbe42a9aae6218

This hot wallet has been confirmed by Jennifer Robertson’s affidavit as well as the Court Monitor overseeing the QuadrigaCX creditor hearing.

So, there is no discrepancy here about the identity of the 0xb6aac wallet address, nor should there be.

Again, to reiterate, the transaction that was just shown is a completely legitimate transaction and the process shown above is typical of all exchanges.
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Why Do Exchanges Use This Hot Wallet Process?

For those that do not understand how exchanges work, they may be reading this wondering to themselves, ‘Why would exchanges create deposit addresses instead of just having customers send funds directly to the hot wallet?’

This is a great question, but one that has a very simple answer.

The answer is: This process is the only way to efficiently keep track of customer deposits to exchanges and credit their accounts.

Brief Example

If Joe Blow opens an account with Binance (for example) or any other exchange, and wishes to deposit Bitcoin, for instance, then Binance will simply provide them with a deposit address.

By doing so, Binance is able to keep track of exactly how much Joe Blow sent to the exchange.

If Binance were accepting all deposits in one massive wallet, then they would have no way of telling exactly who is sending them money or how much has been sent. Thus, they would have no way of crediting customer accounts.

By providing a unique deposit address that their systems have associated with Joe Blow’s account, they will know with certainty exactly how many bitcoins Joe Blow has sent to the exchange. This allows exchanges to set up an efficient, automated system where customers can send money to their deposit addresses at any point during the day and be credited successfully for the amount that they sent.

Key Fact: Customers Do Not Control Deposit Addresses

One key fact that must be enumerated in this report is that customers do not control their deposit addresses.

These wallets are under the control of the exchange themselves because exchanges are the ones that create these wallets. These wallets also exist keep track of customer deposits and credit customer accounts.

Once funds are in a deposit address, they are sent directly to the exchange’s ‘hot wallet’ 99.9% of the time. This is common practice and is standard among virtually exchanges (excluding decentralized exchanges) in the cryptocurrency space, regardless of jurisdiction, size, etc.

Corroborating Statements From Jesse Powell

Since the author is not the owner of an exchange, some may doubt whether the author has the breadth of the knowledge to speak about exchange practice.

Fortunately, readers do not have to take the author’s word for it, because the author was able to get into contact with Jesse Powell, the owner of Kraken exchange.

For those that do not know, Kraken is one of the oldest, functioning exchanges in the cryptocurrency space. Kraken has been in operation for 7+ years at this point with Jesse Powell at its head. In total, Kraken has handled well over a $1 trillion in combined transaction volume. Jesse Powell is also a very notable, public figure in the cryptocurrency space and has contributed insight into the inner workings of exchanges on a number of different occasions.

In specific, the conversation between the author and Jesse Powell occurred on Twitter through this thread:

As an added note, this is Jesse Powell’s confirmed account and several media sources (including Bloomberg and the New York Times) have also cited this Twitter account as the one belonging to Jesse Powell. There is no dispute over the identity of the @jespow Twitter account.

In the instance that the conversation is compromised/deleted for any reason, here is an archived link:

James Edwards on Twitter: “Just trying to get a better understanding …

Just trying to get a better understanding of how exchanges work and you’re the best guy to go to lol. All the amounts transferred in and out look *really* massive. Do you guys have a special wallet for certain customers? Or is this a wallet for something else?

In specific, the author asked:
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Jesse Powell then responded by saying:
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Jesse Powell also stated:
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The author then responded by saying:
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Jesse’s response to this was:
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What should be noted in Jesse’s last response posted above is the statement, “If he [Kraken Customer] is sending from his accounts at other exchanges, he almost certainly does not have control of the sending address.”
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Visiting the Kraken Example Address

The address that Jesse and the author were discussing, in specific, was this one:

Ethereum Accounts, Addresses and Contracts

The Ethereum BlockChain Explorer, API and Analytics Platform

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Below is a screenshot (at the time of writing) of the most recent deposits into this address:

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The ‘Bitfinex_4’ wallet, is Bitfinex’s hot wallet. The ‘Kraken_5’ wallet is Kraken’s hot wallet.

As confirmed by Jesse Powell in his conversation with the author, the 0xfcd wallet is a Kraken deposit address.

So, what we can tell from the above picture and Jesse’s statements is that:

  1. The customer is a client at Bitfinex.
  2. The customer is also a client at Kraken.
  3. The customer initiated a withdrawal from Bitfinex into their Kraken account by having the funds sent into their Kraken deposit address.
  4. Kraken controls that deposit address, but it has been created for the customer specifically.
  5. Once funds are deposited, Kraken sweeps these funds into their ‘hot wallet’ (Kraken_5).

This process is basic and serves as yet another example of how ‘hot wallets’ work.
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Hot Wallets Do Send Withdrawals

While customer do not send deposits to exchange hot wallets, they do receive withdrawals from them.

Below is a list of numerous confirmed QuadrigaCX Ethereum customer withdrawals:

  1. 0xa7958411e5fb06ee7c9efe713c07c2e09f5f327ec14f20e60e0572561dc9f52e
  2. 0x3baf3020a74c81992e2d0bfa679693c85a93e74474d349c3cd2de11f9a80301f
  3. 0xc71b85807c524f0ce7a38966db5db51f14d93cdfb2de6a268885361faff97665
  4. 0x19277877e99543afc03e908696c709fc9ee58251e97da82b13cfa57332cb81de

In each one of the transactions above, we can see funds being sent from the QuadrigaCX hot wallet address:

Sample Customer Withdrawal Transaction #1: 0xa7958411e5fb06ee7c9efe713c07c2e09f5f327ec14f20e60e0572561dc9f52e

Sample Customer Withdrawal Transaction #2: 0x3baf3020a74c81992e2d0bfa679693c85a93e74474d349c3cd2de11f9a80301f

Sample Customer Withdrawal Transaction #3: 0xc71b85807c524f0ce7a38966db5db51f14d93cdfb2de6a268885361faff97665

Sample Customer Withdrawal Transaction #4: 0x19277877e99543afc03e908696c709fc9ee58251e97da82b13cfa57332cb81de

Strange Observation in the Bitfinex Deposit Address

Remember at the beginning of this piece, we mentioned this Bitfinex deposit address?: 0xd72709b353deD6c8068cc78988613587a4CAe8De

Well, after further research, the author noticed something strange.

See below:

The highlighted deposits into the Bitfinex Deposit Address come from this wallet address: 0x7ea5e875a386b66d11a0ad1866ca7b5f2745f049

Discovery at the 0x7ea5e875a386b66d11a0ad1866ca7b5f2745f049 Address

Here is the Etherscan link for that wallet address:

Ethereum Accounts, Addresses and Contracts
_The Ethereum BlockChain Explorer, API and Analytics Platform_etherscan.io

Specifically, the transactions highlighted below caught the attention of the author and relevant researchers:

Here are the Transaction IDs for both transactions:

  1. https://etherscan.io/tx/0x1d4df44a7900df68d5bd2aea5a93751f057a2137f5a139240cbef9dcae1e843e
  2. https://etherscan.io/tx/0xcd40512939afa3d9f62d292a5f455c1dffcec9ad53c2eefba362977e9b594e65

If one visits the links above, we can see that this wallet sent funds straight to QuadrigaCX’s hot wallet.

This actually occurred a total of three times (link to the third will be included later), but the first two links are in reference to the two transactions to the QuadrigaCX hot wallet that are seen in the above screenshot.

What Does This Mean?

As noted earlier in this report, this means that there is a 99% chance that this is a QuadrigaCX owned wallet.

To reiterate the points made by the author and Jesse Powell, the founder of Kraken Exchange, deposit addresses belong to exchanges. Exchanges possess the private keys to these addresses.

In addition, exchanges never send withdrawals to customers from these deposit addresses.

As noted above in this report, after reviewing countless transactions, there is no instance in which a customer at QuadrigaCX received funds from a deposit address belonging to any customer at QuadrigaCX, including themselves.

OverArching Conclusion That Can Be Made Here

At this point, we have established that the 0x7ea5e875a386b66d11a0ad1866ca7b5f2745f049 wallet address has sent funds to QuadrigaCX’s hot wallet. We know for a fact that this is QuadrigaCX’s hot wallet based on Jennifer’s affidavit, which lists this address, as well confirming statements from the Court Monitor.

We can see this same wallet (0x7ea5e875a386b66d11a0ad1866ca7b5f2745f049) sending Ethereum directly to a Bitfinex deposit address (0xd72709b353ded6c8068cc78988613587a4cae8de).

Thus, we can conclude:

  1. This was not a withdrawal that was initiated by a customer.
  2. This withdrawal was sent by the QuadrigaCX exchange themselves on their own behalf.
  3. The Bitfinex deposit address (0xd72709b353ded6c8068cc78988613587a4cae8de) belongs to QuadrigaCX.

Examining the QuadrigaCX-Owned Bitfinex Deposit Address

Now that it has been established that the Bitfinex deposit wallet was created for QuadrigaCX, it is worth examining what exactly is going on in the wallet.

Brief Disclaimer: To be clear, QuadrigaCX does not own the keys to this wallet, Bitfinex does. We have simply established that QuadrigaCX, as an exchange, is the customer whom this Bitfinex deposit address was created for. This, in itself, does not place any fault upon Bitfinex or imply collusion. This, also does not explicitly mean that QuadrigaCX was wrong for owning such a deposit address. More exposition on this relationship will be given later on. For convenience, this wallet will be labeled the ‘Quadriga-owned Bitfinex Deposit Address’, but readers should keep in mind that QuadrigaCX does not have the private keys to this wallet — Bitfinex does. This is just enumerating the fact that the deposit address was created for QuadrigaCX as a client. Therefore, they were the directors of funds going into the wallet.

Specifically, the Quadriga-owned Bitfinex Deposit Wallet sent two transactions worth approximately $606,668.63 at the time of transfer.

The QuadrigaCX hot wallet itself sent a total of 20,198 Ethereum valued at $6,844,756.48 USD at the time of transfer.

Poloniex’s Hot Wallet Sent Funds to This Address As Well

The wallet 0x32be343b94f860124dc4fee278fdcbd38c102d88 sent funds to the Quadriga-owned Bitfinex Deposit Wallet as well.

There is just one transaction from this wallet, which was sent on June 24th, 2018, for a total of 50 Ethereum, which was valued at $22,757 at the time of transfer.

The wallet 0x32be343b94f860124dc4fee278fdcbd38c102d88, in specific, is the Poloniex hot wallet.

Does That Mean Poloniex is Involved?

No, because the Poloniex hot wallet is sending the funds. While that cannot be ruled out, obviously, what is provided here is not evidence of Poloniex’s involvement and the author is not stating as much or implying such.

What Does it Mean Then?

This means that the client owner of the Bitfinex Deposit Wallet(QuadrigaCX), also has/had an account at Poloniex and they initiated the withdrawal from their Poloniex account into the Quadriga-owned Bitfinex Deposit Wallet.

An Old QuadrigaCX Cold Wallet Sent Significant Funds to This Bitfinex Deposit Address

In specific, the address 0x0ee4e2d09aec35bdf08083b649033ac0a41aa75e sent significant funds to the Quadriga-owned Bitfinex Deposit Wallet

This wallet, in specific, has been determined to be a former cold wallet address for QuadrigaCX.

Taylor Monahan, founder of MyCrypto, as well as the firm, Elementus, positively identified this wallet as belonging to QuadrigaCX as well.

In total, the QuadrigaCX Cold Wallet sent 13,819 Ethereum to the Quadriga-owned Bitfinex deposit address, worth a total of $775,997.52 at the time of transfer (four transfers in total).

The QuadrigaCX Cold Wallet also sent 4,000 Ethereum ($1.9 million worth at the time of transfer) to 0x185a3c26a1a5deb37c7fd02007b0fde19db61df3, which was subsequently sent directly to the Quadriga-owned Bitfinex address.

QuadrigaCX Old Hot Wallet Sent Funds as Well

The wallet 0x027beefcbad782faf69fad12dee97ed894c68549 sent funds to the Quadriga-owned Bitfinex Deposit Wallet as well.

This wallet has long been known as QuadrigaCX’s former hot wallet and is even denominated as such in Etherscan as well as all other reputable Ethereum block explorers.

This address was confirmed as belonging to QuadrigaCX after the discovery of an error made with a send from this wallet to a contract address which resulted in the loss of 60k+ Ethereum.

In specific, the QuadrigaCX’s former hot wallet sent two transactions on June 2nd, 2017, totaling 3,000 Ethereum (worth approximately $665,122.22 at the time of transfer).

Another Notable Wallet Address

Up to this point, all addresses that sent funds to the Quadriga-owned Bitfinex Deposit Wallet have been identified definitively.

However, the one address that sent funds to this address that has not been covered, has not yet been identified.

Here is the address: 0xc3cae4118fec40ef386e01eb04b7e66dc0e5b643

This address sent 945.156726 Ethereum on July 2nd, 2018 to the Quadriga-owned Bitfinex Deposit Wallet for a value at transfer of $450,442.79.

What is notable about this wallet is that there are multiple sends to the QuadrigaCX hot wallet.

In total, the 0xc3cae wallet initiated 23 transactions going to the QuadrigaCX hot wallet spanning from April 26th, 2018 to October 31st, 2018.

These 23 transactions accounted for 1,992 Ethereum that was sent to the QuadrigaCX hot wallet for a total value of $790,067 at the time of transfer.

Thus, it can be said that it is beyond dispute that the 0xc3ae wallet is a deposit address for QuadrigaCX. Given this fact, it can be said that the private keys for this address belongs to QuadrigaCX.

Again, it must be reiterated that customer withdrawals are never sent via deposit addresses but rather from the hot wallet itself.

Analysis from Taylor Monahan of MyCrypto also confirms this fact.

Aggregated Stats of the Bitfinex Deposit Address

In its entirety, this wallet sent 44,000 Ethereum to Bitfinex for a total USD value (at transfer) of $13,610,235. Research by Taylor Monahan corroborates this number as well.

Poloniex Hot Wallet to QuadrigaCX’s Hot Wallet

Another notable transfer on the exchange occurred between QuadrigaCX’s hot wallet and Poloniex’s hot wallet.

Poloniex’s Hot Wallet =

Below, are 12 transaction IDs and where the Poloniex Hot Wallet sent money directly to the QuadrigaCX Hot Wallet (with corresponding values):

  1. 0x454e71694a2b18336cbc8ba6c30b1e2feb3eceadde6268c1dc934109d273a6f1 [34.99 Ethereum; $4,828.97] May 1st, 2018
  2. 0x47ab5ec6f03a232eae52d4c4ac87135980e34e6fcb92aeb26193c5b5b28e55e1 [49.99 Ethereum; $6,920.62] July 5th, 2018
  3. 0x474c851f1d3486abd6e70c4cfbd2aed8f16fffbc863cdd1e3086c3625c357320 [101 Ethereum; $14,077.51] October 17th, 2018
  4. 0x040656b3408b77b0092acaeaebb897334b0cbffe709115dfff8c130ab33005d7 [99.99 Ethereum; $13,843.62] October 20th, 2018
  5. 0x6d79b97b4b7714a85f8ad3614b0073053dd63c727714c9c0c05bd08286aa27bb [119.99 Ethereum; $16,613.82] October 22nd, 2018
  6. 0x550654c59564315b9b4b3a1fe50d681f3631b38618ddc34923dad6f385be98ff [99.99 Ethereum; $13,846.62] October 27th, 2018
  7. 0x9fb14e39f46fc0b4d84b1b0c60255ece7a33a15f982e9d4fd4849f99a5cc8a14 [12.99 Ethereum; $1,798.86] October 31st, 2018
  8. 0x01e911bd081570c546e1a2b41e5c9001bbf344b4ba28503f4f33207d570aa3a9 [39.99 Ethereum; $5,537.42] November 6th, 2018
  9. 0x284f758709e34678828e4ff9bba730fee20315cde9ba3bd9228d28de66f648eb [99.99 Etheruem; $13,845.62] November 10th, 2018
  10. 0x2098459102fc2c37835e351bd55d759d22a39bcc79b008c0d60dfa344dc20f07 [83.35563739 Ethereum; $11,544.76] November 12th, 2018
  11. 0x89694234c81ca2267f81297402a92a25b2ebdb3f1f2913caaa12b53e47049a43 [95.31964568 Ethereum; $13,201.77] November 17th, 2018
  12. 0xcdeeafccc652298d76dbf73e1e5970a03d9ea0dbc4cf76b4abf876ae66d43613 [172.20297552 Ethereum; $23,891.44] November 21st, 2018

Each of the transactions above shows money coming from the Poloniex Hot Wallet going into the QuadrigaCX Hot Wallet directly.

The likelihood of this being an independent customer at both Poloniex and QuadrigaCX that simply couldn’t master the concept of sending Ethereum to the QuadrigaCX deposit address is next to zero.

So What Does This Mean?

The Poloniex Hot Wallet sending funds directly to the QuadrigaCX Hot Wallet means that QuadrigaCX was initiating the withdrawals from Poloniex directly to their hot wallet.

This is the only explanation that makes logical sense that does not imply serious criminal negligence or widespread collusion between these exchanges.

Putting the Facts Together

Based on the cumulative analysis of Taylor Monahan, the CEO of MyCrypto, Elementus, a blockchain research firm that was cited by the Wall Street Journal, and the author of this report, it appears that there is a high likelihood that there are funds that belong to QuadrigaCX at Bitfinex and Poloniex.

Given the statements made by Jennifer Robertson in her affidavit, we know that:

  1. Gerry Cotten was the only individual with access to the crypto storage of QuadrigaCX and that he was the only one that had knowledge of where the crypto was stored.
  2. It is possible that Gerry Cotten stored the crypto funds at other exchanges.

Thus, it seems more than reasonable to assume there could be a massive chunk of cryptocurrency stored at either Poloniex or Bitfinex.

With this report, we can now confirm that QuadrigaCX had accounts at both exchanges. Also, Jennifer Robertson’s affidavit states that Gerry Cotten was the only one managing and moving the cryptocurrency, so presumably, the accounts that QuadrigaCX had at these exchanges would have been opened in his name (under KYC/AML regulations).

Massive Deposits to Poloniex

The address 0x57b727dc48b5d9261958e0fb9f94fa02dc328bf6 was positively identified by Taylor Monahan, the CEO of MyCrypto, as well as the author as a Poloniex deposit address belonging to QuadrigaCX.

Below is a link to the wallet on Etherscan:


This wallet sent $7,791,514 to Poloniex and Polo alone. All money came from QuadrigaCX and Quadriga alone.

In total, this wallet sent 218,312 Ethereum over to Poloniex.

In today’s value, the holdings of this wallet would be worth $30,161,985.

Since this Poloniex deposit address received funds from both of QuadrigaCX’s hot wallets as well as their old cold wallet (which never sends out customer withdrawals), it seems more than reasonable to peg this as a likely method of storage by QuadrigaCX.

Massive Deposits to Bitfinex

As noted earlier in this report, the Bitfinex deposit wallet that definitively belongs to QuadrigaCX received approximately 44,000 Ethereum, worth $13,610,235 at the time of transfer.

There are other addresses that research by Taylor Monahan, CEO of MyCrypto, as well as the author of this report have pegged as definitively belonging to QuadrigaCX.

Bitfinex Deposit Wallet #2 0x696dd748a2edd9692ed93bd592dd2f293483eada

This wallet is another Bitfinex deposit address.

In this wallet, 133,720.8691 Ethereum with a value (at transfer) of $1,569,973 was sent to Bitfinex.

At today’s prices, this Ethereum would be worth $18,474,755.

We can confirm that this client deposit address was created for the QuadrigaCX exchange (not a customer) because of a send from the 0x0247bc4e03142079cfa2e3daf500722ed0f9a6b2 wallet address.

This wallet (also identified by Taylor Monahan as belonging to QuadrigaCX) has multiple transactions in its history going to the QuadrigaCX Hot Wallet.

Screenshot of the 0x0247bc4e03142079cfa2e3daf500722ed0f9a6b2 wallet with transactions going to QuadrigaCX’s hot wallet highlighted.

Thus, we can deem this 0x0247bc wallet to be a QuadrigaCX-owned and controlled wallet.

Since it is also seen sending funds to Bitfinex Deposit Address #2, we can definitively peg the Bitfinex Deposit Address #2 as belonging to QuadrigaCX as well.

Screenshot of the 0x0247 address sending funds to Bitfinex Deposit Address #2

Additional Proof

Approximately two years ago, QuadrigaCX lost 60k+ Ethereum by sending it to a smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain without the correct ‘calls’ (Solidity function), so instead of the funds being forwarded to QuadrigaCX’s old Ethereum hot wallet, they remained trapped within the contract forever.

Below is a detailed link that explains the entire ordeal:



The address that made this incorrect send was the 0x0247bc4e03142079cfa2e3daf500722ed0f9a6b2 address. So we can now empirically confirm that 0x0247bc4e03142079cfa2e3daf500722ed0f9a6b2 belongs to QuadrigaCX.

Additional Revelations

Since we have now determined that the 0x0247 address belongs to QuadrigaCX, we can now state that the following addresses also belong to (and are controlled by) QuadrigaCX as well:

  1. 0x45cab8d124fce8663581172c614f2ee08d01d48e
  2. 0x67fc93fd01a15d9fb02a80d0ae6207fb45625be4
  3. 0xd543154fb94528c4fc54b9c27128c2d86c6322be
  4. 0x79855af491352646e73bd12d7b92d6c814e71b4c
  5. 0xb90a82ec61627885eab72f4253939285ba40c91d

Wallet 0xd543154fb94528c4fc54b9c27128c2d86c6322be

This wallet sent 61,520 Ethereum to Bitfinex Hot Wallets, for a total value (at the time of transfer) of $41,535,073.39.

All of these funds were sent from November 5th, 2017 to December 8th, 2018.

Wallet 0x79855af491352646e73bd12d7b92d6c814e71b4c

This wallet sent 84,248.54048 Ethereum to Kraken for a total USD value of $16,051,305 at the time of transfer.

Wallet 0x45cab8d124fce8663581172c614f2ee08d01d48e

All transactions going out of this wallet went to other QuadrigaCX addresses.

Wallet 0x67fc93fd01a15d9fb02a80d0ae6207fb45625be4

In total, this wallet sent out 19,888 Ethereum. All of the Ethereum was redirected to other known and exclusively controlled QuadrigaCX addresses (which were covered earlier), which are:

  • 0xd543154fb94528c4fc54b9c27128c2d86c6322be
  • 0x79855af491352646e73bd12d7b92d6c814e71b4c
  • 0x0247bc4e03142079cfa2e3daf500722ed0f9a6b2

Ethereum was also sent to a fourth wallet address, which was not covered:


In total, 3600 Ethereum was sent to this address, worth a total of $5,137.61 at the time of transfer.

Wallet 0xb90a82ec61627885eab72f4253939285ba40c91d (Poloniex Deposit Address)

In total, this address has sent 107,908 Ethereum for a total USD value (at time of transfer) of $19,932,050 to Poloniex.

Cumulative Results

Confirmed QuadrigaCX ETH Wallets:

  1. 0x0ee4e2d09aec35bdf08083b649033ac0a41aa75e
  2. 0xd72709b353ded6c8068cc78988613587a4cae8de
  3. 0xb6aac3b56ff818496b747ea57fcbe42a9aae6218 (current hot wallet)
  4. 0x027beefcbad782faf69fad12dee97ed894c68549 (former hot wallet)
  5. 0x45cab8d124fce8663581172c614f2ee08d01d48e
  6. 0x696dd748a2edd9692ed93bd592dd2f293483eada
  7. 0x0247bc4e03142079cfa2e3daf500722ed0f9a6b2
  8. 0xd543154fb94528c4fc54b9c27128c2d86c6322be
  9. 0x67fC93fD01A15D9FB02a80D0AE6207fB45625be4
  10. 0xb90a82ec61627885eab72f4253939285ba40c91d
  11. 0x79855af491352646e73bd12d7b92d6c814e71b4c
  12. 0x57b727dc48b5d9261958e0fb9f94fa02dc328bf6

It is worth noting the date of the last outgoing transaction of the following wallets:

  1. 0xd72709b353ded6c8068cc78988613587a4cae8de (December 3rd, 2018)
  2. 0x45cab8d124fce8663581172c614f2ee08d01d48e (December 8th, 2018)
  3. 0x0247bc4e03142079cfa2e3daf500722ed0f9a6b2 (December 3rd, 2018)
  4. 0xd543154fb94528c4fc54b9c27128c2d86c6322be (December 8th, 2018)
  5. 0x67fC93fD01A15D9FB02a80D0AE6207fB45625be4 (December 8th, 2018)

The date of the last outgoing transaction for the following wallets is of interest in these cases because Gerry Cotten died on December 9th, 2018.

Thus, the cease of further activity in the wallets above appear to corroborate the idea that Gerry Cotten was indeed the manager of QuadrigaCX’s assets and that his sudden death led to a cease in activity.

Total Amount of Ethereum Sent to Kraken, Poloniex and Bitfinex

  1. In total, Bitfinex received 239,240 Ethereum ($85,307,293 at the time of transfer) from QuadrigaCX.
  2. In total, Kraken received 84,248 Ethereum ($16,051,305 at the time of transfer) from QuadrigaCX
  3. In total, Poloniex received 326,220 Ethereum ($27,723,564 at the time of transfer) from QuadrigaCX.

Altogether, a cumulative 649,708 Ethereum was sent to these three exchanges directly by QuadrigaCX, which was worth a total of $100,490,150 at the time of transfer.

In today’s value, that Ethereum would be worth $90.3 million.



540 comments on “QuadrigaCX Ethereum Storage Found

  1. I came across a thread constructively written by LTBergel on Twitter saying how the Quadriga scam is premeditated and how he has been able to recover funds for victims. Send him a direct message to know more.

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